gender inequality generated by the gender division of labor in the family, I criticize luck egalitarianism for failing to address properly the injustice of gender inequality generated by the gender division of labor. My discussion of luck egalitarianism is primarily concerned with Ronald Dworkin' s theory of equality. I argue that luck egalitarians'concepts of luck and choice do not rightly capture the gendered social structure and women' s choices contextualized within such a structure, respectively. I also argue that the luck-choice distinction is not an adequate device for considering the injustice of gender arising from the systemic relationship between the gendered social structure and women' s choices. Given my critiques of luck egalitarianism, I
offer a brief outline of what a better feminist theory of equality should be. In this paper, I characterize the gender inequality that those women experience as being systemic, and I criticize luck egalitarianism for failing to address properly the systemic injustice of gender. My discussion of luck egalitarianism is primarily concerned with Ronald Dworkin' s theory of equality as a representative form of luck egalitarianism. arising from the systemic relationship between the gendered social structure and women' s choice. 7) Given my critiques and reformulations of luck egalitarianism, I offer a
brief outline of what a good feminist theory of equality should be.
I begin by discussing the importance of luck egalitarianism for a feminist concern.
Next, I explore general features of gender inequality generated by the gender division of labor in the family and characterize it as the systemic injustice of gender. Then, I
examine how luck egalitarianism fails to address the systemic injustice of gender.
Ⅱ. Why Luck Egalitarianism?
Why with the strong reliance on individual autonomy and liberty. 10) In this trend of the times, luck egalitarianism intends to accommodate diversity issues, such as feminism, while retaining the liberal framework to some degree. This objective is fundamentally grounded in the luck/choice distinction that luck egalitarians propose. Luck egalitarians believe that the idea of luck and relevant social responsibility yield a substantive account of equality that normatively accommodates diversity issues; that, at the same time, the notion of choice and relevant personal responsibility highlight individual autonomy and liberty. That is, the luck/choice distinction enables luck egalitarians to achieve such a double-sided objective. Thus for luck egalitarians, luck and choice, social responsibility and personal responsibility, and equality and liberty are not conflicting notions. Rather, they are compatible with each other within the luck/choice framework.
Significantly, therefore, luck egalitarians claim that through the luck/choice distinction, gender injustice can be successfully incorporated into their equality discussion. Dworkin, for example, specifically uses the luck/choice distinction as a device to criticize real-world injustices. He specifies that one of the greatest problems of current American society is social stratification based on gender, race, and talent:
women, blacks and the handicapped are often excluded from the highest ranks of income, wealth, power, prestige, and authority. According to Dworkin, if such inequalities result from factors of gender, race, and handicaps (and/or discrimination based on gender, race, and the natural lack of talents), the inequalities are unjust. Since people' s "gender, race, or particular sets of skills and handicaps"are aspects of luck beyond their control, their fates should be "insensitive"to those effects of luck. 11) On
Dworkin' s account, implementing his theory of "equality of resources,"which neutralizes the effects of luck in the distribution of resources, would ultimately solve such inequality problems of gender.
Luck egalitarians, however, do not say that all inequalities of gender are simply unjust. They stipulate that some inequalities of gender deriving from the choices that women voluntarily make are acceptable. In particular, Arneson emphasizes the outcomes of women' s choices and preferences in egalitarian family justice. 12) He claims that family justice should be achieved in a way that respects the difference between husband and wife in their preferences, values, and aspiration. That is, if a wife has a strong preference for laundering and taking care of children rather than for doing paid labor in the market and if husband has a strong preference for doing paid labor rather I will return to this question in the section Ⅳ.
Ⅲ. The Systemic Injustice of Gender
Understanding the actual lives of women and the injustices they face should not only take precedence over, but also should be the foundation of all feminist inquiries and criticisms. For the purpose of examining and characterizing the situation of women, from which the major issues of gender injustice arise, I focus on the unequal situation of women at work and in the family, which is generated by the gender division of labor in the family. I characterize such inequality as being systemic, and I argue that the systemic injustice of gender is engendered by a relationship between the gendered social structure grounded in the gender division of labor and women' s choices within the structure. Let me illustrate the systemic injustice of gender generated by the gender division of labor in the family.
The gender division of labor in the family does not simply denote the gender-based separate labor assignments in the household. Instead, it has broad social, economic, and cultural implications, that is, it is an aspect of social structure. The gender division of labor in the family involves the gender-based separate organization of market work and family work. The labor market is designed for "ideal workers"(mostly men) who work full time or overtime and do not have primary responsibilities for housework and child caring.
On the other hand, women are still often considered to have primary responsibilities for family work and child caring. This separate organization of market work and family work also entails distinct gender role expectations and ideologies (e.g. men as breadwinner vs. women as homemaker) and different characterizations of men' s work and women' s work (e.g. earning money vs. nursing and caring). The gender division of labor is justified, maintained, and reproduced through social norms, practices, and customs. 13) In other words, the gender division of labor is not a formal socio-economic and/or legal institution. It is a form of social structure that includes all aspects of role expectations and ideologies, social rules and norms, cultural customs, socialization, and education.
The injustice of the gender division of labor arises because this separate organization of market work and family work (the occupational differentiation between the genders) results in the status inequality of gender, by disadvantaging women as a group while privileging men as a group. The gender division of labor not only causes the marginalization of women in the labor market, but also, more broadly, engenders the overall unequal situation of women relative to men in the socioeconomic and political domains. Given that the organization of the labor market is fundamentally structured around the idea of the "ideal-worker norm,"those women who have responsibilities for housework and child caring cannot compete with "ideal workers"(mostly men) on equal terms. Childcare and household responsibilities, for example, often induce women to seek more convenient and less-energy intensive occupations, such as part-time and/or temporary jobs. Women workers are more likely to be "trapped in part-time positions with low pay and few benefits,"as Deborah Rhode puts it 14) and "funneled into lowpaying, low status-job." 15) This unequal situation of women in the work force reflects and reinforces the unequal situation of women in the family, and this leads to a vicious cycle of inequality of gender.
In the U.S., although women represent almost half of the labor force, white men still ; one-fifth of all children are poor. 23) Nearly 80 percent of the poor are women and children. 24) Although this gendered social structure is an important element in describing gender inequality, it does not comprise the whole picture. This is because the system of gender encompasses not only the gendered social structure, but also women' s choice. A system is comprised of agents as actors who can respond to social structure and social relationships and form their lives. Choice, however, does not exist independent from social structure. The choices and behavior of agents are inevitably contextualized within the social structure.
Concerning the contextualized preferences and choices of women who are situated at work and in the family, there are various factors of the gendered social structure that shape women' s making choices in their career and housework decision. These factors include such things as gender role ideology, which classifies men as breadwinners and economic providers and woman with homemakers and caregivers; social institutions and organizations designed for full-time workers regarding working hours and location; sex-role socialization through media and family environment that express genderrelated values and attitudes; a formal educational system that trains boys and girls in favor of maintaining gender stereotypes and traditional sex roles; cultural customs that grant different social rules and norms for the genders; working environment and culture in the labor market that intentionally and unintentionally discriminate against women workers in terms of promotion opportunities, wage differences, and work assignments;
and gender-biased governmental policies and programs that cause the massive dismissal of women workers. Although these may not comprise a complete list for fully illuminating women' s contextualized choices at work and in the family, career and housework decisions for many individual women are not the product of independent and voluntary preferences, but the result of influences of these multiple factors. Thus, it is simply wrong to say that individuals can make "voluntary"or "genuine"choices free from the influence of social structure and circumstances, as human capitalists claim.
25)
Rather, individual women' s reasons for making choices are complex, but they show up in a collective and patterned way.
Similarly, some feminists such as Nancy Folbre and Ingrid Robeyns also illustrate various elements of social structure (e.g. gender ideology, relative resources of the spouses, time availability, etc.) that have influence on women' s occupational and housework decisions. I basically agree with Folbre and Robeyns that the formation of women' s preferences and choices are influenced by manifold factors of the gendered social structure. However, there is an important point with which I have a problem: they do not particularly take account of women' s agency. In describing contextualized women' s choices within the gendered social structure, they claim that women' s choices are constrained by social structure, which they call "gendered constraints. through the gendered social structure. Here I want to adopt an interpretation of the self and agency that has been proposed by some relational autonomy theorists including Jennifer Nedelsky and Marilyn Friedman. According to them, social circumstances and relationships not only are necessary for forming a person' s self, but also actually contribute to constituting the self.
The most important feature of analyzing gender as a system, therefore, lies in the relationship between social structure and agency. The systemic analysis of gender rejects a simple dichotomy between social structure and agency. As Anthony Giddens notes, "structure is always both enabling and constraining [agency] , in virtue of the inherent relation between structure and agency,"which he calls "the duality of structure." 27) The gendered social structure and women' s agency are not exclusive at all.
Gender inequality arises neither from the problem of the gendered social structure nor as an outcome of women' s choices. Rather, the unequal situation of women at work and in the family results from the injustice of the system of gender as a whole -the "inherent relation"between a social structure based on the gender division of labor in the family and women' s choices contextualized within such a structure.
Ⅳ. Limits of Luck Egalitarianism
I earlier asked whether the luck/choice distinction is a useful device to address gender injustice. My answer is in the negative. I argue that ⑴ the luck-egalitarian concepts of luck and choice fail to include the gendered social structure and contextualized women' s choice, respectively; ⑵ the luck/choice distinction fails to address the systemic relationship between the gendered social structure and contextualized women' s choices within the structure.
Women' s Luck
If the luck/choice distinction is critical in the consideration of justice, one significant Regarding the luck-egalitarian idea of luck, I focus on Dworkin' s concept of luck developed in his theory of "equality of resources."Dworkin explicitly describes several factors of (brute) luck, that is, the aspect of a person' s condition beyond her control.
According to Dworkin, a person' s luck significantly includes "personal resources"such as "physical and mental health and ability." 28) In addition, he says that people' s luck includes "their economic backgrounds, gender, race, or particular sets of skills and handicaps." 29) At some point, he also states that a person' s bad luck is "to be born into a relatively poor family or a family that is selfish or spend thrift." 30) The primary purpose of his "equality of resources"is to distribute resources in a manner sensitive to people' s choices but insensitive to their "personal resources"and those other sorts of luck.
For this purpose, Dworkin provides a hypothetical insurance market as a way to neutralize the influence of luck in distributing resources. In the market, it is assumed that people are situated behind a modified veil of ignorance where each person has the perfect knowledge of society as well as of her personality, such as tastes, preferences, and ambitions, but she does not know the possible bad luck that might happen to her in real society; it is also assumed that people share an equal amount of resources and that with these equal resources, they insure some of their initial resources against the possible bad luck. People' s decisions regarding whether or not to insure against what kinds of luck are made based on their tastes and preference. The availability of an insurance market thus does give everyone an equal opportunity to mitigate the ill effects of luck by insuring against them, while it does not trespass the choice-sensitive principle.
Consider a case of handicaps that Dworkin offers. In a hypothetical insurance market for handicaps, people do not know whether they are handicapped or not in the actual society, but it is assumed that they are equally aware of the susceptibility of the various sorts of handicaps that might happen to them. The basic formulation of the insurance market for handicaps is grounded in the counter-factual assumption that Given this feature, can we say that Dworkin' s hypothetical insurance market for gender successfully neutralizes the ill effects of gender? Does Dworkin' s concept of luck properly take into account the social structure, which is grounded in the gender division of labor in the family? I think it does not. As I showed earlier, the essence of the gendered social structure lies not only in the separate organization of market work and family work, but also in the distinct characterizations of men' s work and women' s work and the different value judgments regarding their work. That is, women and men have different occupations, and those occupations are given different values. Often so-called women' s work at home, such as housework and child caring, is lowly valued. They are not generally financially compensated on the market at all, or are poorly compensated.
They are not even regarded as "real"work. In the current monetary society, unpaid work, which most women do, is directly tied to the overall low status of women with regard to wealth, honor, power, and prestige. Also, typical female jobs in the labor market, such as that of daycare worker, baby-sitter, waitress, nurse, typically are given little respect and are poorly paid. The low value of those "female"jobs significantly reflects the low value given by society to the "unreal"work of women at home. In contrast, work in the labor market, which most men do, does usually receive formal monetary compensation. Such work is generally valued as "real"work. The society is
70
The Korean Journal of International Relations, Volume47, Number5, 2007 31) It is questionable whether people know their genders in hypothetical insurance markets. However, considering that Dworkin notes the problem of prejudice based on gender and race in the markets, which I will not discuss in detail in this paper, it is assumed that people know their genders in Dworkin' s scheme. designed to suit "real"workers, assuming that "real"workers have someone at home to do the "unreal"work.
The gendered social structure, therefore, can be essentially characterized as a social system of value accorded to the differences of occupations held by the genders. It puts low value on the housework that women primarily do, while it puts high value on the market work that men primarily do. It unfairly conditions the life chances and prospects of women, while it privileges those of men. However, it is not my aim here to demand that women' s housework and child caring at home be financially compensated at the same rate as men' s market work; nor do I intend to point out the fault of the market mechanism itself that fails to give people what they deserve. Instead, my aim is to point out the injustice arising from the social system of value regarding women' s work and men' s work that is institutionalized in major institutions and social practices of our current society. I argue that society should fairly recognize devalued (or under-valued) women' s work that inevitably needs to be done, even though the market is not designed to do so. lies not in the fact that they are born as females, but in the gendered social structure that unjustly disadvantages women as a group and advantages men as a group, which
Dworkin' s concept of luck fails to address.
Women' s Choice
Luck egalitarians agree that people should be held responsible for the costs of choices that they make. This point, however, needs careful attention. Luck egalitarians do not simply say that people are responsible for all choices they make. Indeed, they specify that people should take personal responsibility for a certain type of choice, which I call autonomous choice. In identifying autonomous choices for which individuals should be held responsible, luck egalitarians provide various ideas. It is my purpose here to specify Dworkin' s concept of autonomous choices and to apply them to women' s choices in the family and at work. significant degree, by arbitrary circumstantial factors, carefully defines the range of autonomous choices for whose cost a person should be held responsible. In essence, Kaufmann seems to acknowledge that Dworkin, to some extent, takes into account what Martha Nussbaum has described as the problem of "preference deformation."Nussbaum says that some people are unable to exercise a "critical scrutiny"of preferences and desires because "habit, fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions" deform their preferences and desires. 39) If preferences are deformed and, thus, if it is impossible to exercise critical scrutiny of those preferences, the choices resulting from those preferences are not autonomous choices.
Kaufman' s defense of luck egalitarianism, however, is inadequate to cover the choices of caretakers; it is insufficient to respond to Anderson' s criticism. There are at least two problems with Kaufman' s defense. First, whether the preferences of the caretakers are actually classified as "deformed preferences" -the unauthentic that Dworkin enumerates-and thus whether the caretakers are entitled to public assistance, as
Kaufman claims, are problematic questions. Dworkin' s authenticity principle focuses on legal circumstances under which people' s preferences are formed. In describing the principle of authenticity, Dworkin distinguishes his idea of authenticity from "metaphysical"or "psychological"authenticity. He emphasizes that his idea of authenticity concerns only the "absence of legal constraints"in forming a person' s personality. 40) Considering that the preferences of caretakers are influenced largely by socioeconomic and cultural factors rather than by legal factors, caretakers'preferences are properly not considered "authentic"in Dworkin' s scheme, a fact that runs counter to Kaufman' s claims.
Second, I question whether there exist any "authentic"preferences that express a person' s own "true"or "genuine"self that are indifferent to or separate from the context of social circumstances and relationships. As I showed earlier, many of women' s preferences/choices regarding taking care of children or other dependents or taking low-paid part-time/temporarily jobs are intrinsically contextualized within a social structure that is grounded in the gender division of labor in the family. This ultimately permits me to show that it is problematic to say that women necessarily make the types of autonomous/non-autonomous choices that Dworkin characterizes.
Indeed, women' s preferences/choices are not only contextualized within, but also shaped and constructed by the gendered social structure grounded in the gender division of labor. For example, the high price of public/private childcare, her husband' s lack of available time to do housework and care for children, the difficulties she might encounter in getting and holding a full-time job and/or the relatively low wage she could be expected to earn all dynamically help to construct a women' s preference for not working outside of the household at all or for taking a poorly paying part-time job that leaves time for housekeeping and childcare. In conclusion, women' s choices regarding family and work are not perfectly categorized as "autonomous"choices led by "authentic" preferences; they are also not completely identified with "non-autonomous"choices driven by "deformed"preferences. Instead, they are largely choices that are socially constructed within the gendered social structure. Dworkin' s concept of choice fail to capture this aspect of women' s choice.
The Systemic Relationship between Women' s Luck and Women' s Choice
So far I have argued that luck-egalitarian concepts of luck and choice do not properly capture the luck and choice of women situated in the family and at work. Now I offer another fatal limit of luck egalitarianism in its account of gender. Even if luckegalitarian notions of luck and choice were reformulated to encompass particular women' s luck and women' s choices, luck egalitarianism would ultimately still fail to address the systemic injustice of gender. This is because luck egalitarianism, which is fundamentally built upon the luck/choice distinction, cannot fully explain the intrinsic relationship between the gendered social structure and women' s choices. In describing features of the systemic injustice of gender, I earlier explained that the relationship between the gendered social structure and women' s choice is of major importance. The gendered social structure and women' s choice are not independent each other. In contrast, the injustice of gender generated by the gender division of labor has been maintained and reinforced only through the systemic relationship between the gendered social structure and contextualized women' s choice within the structure.
Some critics note that one of the chief problems of luck egalitarianism is that its distinction between luck and choice is ultimately unclear, particularly when applied to the real world. in characterizing gender injustice generated by the gender division of labor in the family, I am concerned with the innate systemic connection between the gendered social structure and women' s agency -how the gendered social structure is justified, maintained, and reproduced by women' s agency and how women' s agency is contextualized, shaped, and constructed by the gendered social structure.
Ⅴ. Conclusion: Toward a Feminist Theory of Equality
The rise of luck egalitarianism in contemporary theories of social justice has drawn much scholarly attention. In spite of such great interest, especially among feminists, however, I have argued that luck egalitarianism ultimately is not a model that can contribute to conceptualizing a good feminist theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism, built upon the luck/choice distinction, has a "flawed understanding of the point of equality,"as Anderson puts it. 43) I argue that the point of feminist equality is not only to address properly the systemic injustice of gender, but also to provide remedies for rectifying it. That is, the systemic analysis of gender is of central importance for conceptualizing a feminist theory of equality.
To conclude, I suggest four criteria that a good feminist equality should satisfy. First, feminist equality should consider the issue of gender to a product of human arrangements although it is beyond an individual' s control. That is, the social relationship between women as a group and men as a group constitutes the issue of relation to men as a group). Second, a feminist equality theory should recognize that factors like social norms and rules, practices, major institutions, cultural customs, socialization, and education all express in a certain way the social relationship between the genders. It should also recognize that these factors have to do with the distribution (and the process of distribution) of power, resources, prestige, and reputations between genders that results in the unequal status of the genders. Third, for the purpose of providing a normative principle of gender relationship, a feminist equality theory should thus offer a fundamental change in the social relationship between the genders, rather than redistributing the effects of the relationship, such as power, resources, prestige, and reputations. Fourth and finally, a feminist theory of equality should take the role of women' s agency seriously. It should recognize that a woman' s self is intrinsically social; her agency is shaped and constructed within the context of social conditions and relationships; and social relationships are essential for promoting women' s autonomy.
